In May 2026, the situation regarding freedom of association and the status of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Belarus remained consistently unfavorable.
The key trends observed during previous monitoring periods persisted, including the effective dismantling of freedom of association, continued pressure on CSOs and their members, the criminalization of independent civic activity, restrictions on access to funding, and the further development of transnational repression practices targeting activists. Of particular significance remains the use of anti-extremism legislation as a tool for criminalizing cooperation with independent organizations and initiatives, as well as intimidating potential participants, partners, donors, and beneficiaries.
Despite a decrease in the rate of non-profit organization (NGOs) liquidations compared to the peak periods of 2021-2024, the consequences of the campaign to dismantle independent civil society continue to have a systemic impact. Targeted forced liquidation of NGOs and pressure on NGOs to self-liquidate continue. As of the end of May 2026, the cumulative institutional losses in the civil society sector since the onset of the post-election crisis in 2020 have reached at least 2,031 NGOs. Of these, at least 1,244 NGOs have been forcibly liquidated or are undergoing forced liquidation proceedings, while at least 787 NGOs have decided to self-liquidate.
The mass liquidation of NGOs has resulted not only in a quantitative reduction of the sector but also in the significant destruction of the infrastructure supporting civic participation, legal and social assistance, independent education, cultural activities, charitable work, and advocacy. Organizations that continue to operate within the country face strict administrative oversight, inspections, the risk of liability for formal violations, and limited access to resources. NGO registration in Belarus continues, but on a highly restricted basis. Since January 2026, for example, only 9 public associations are known to have been registered, while there is no information regarding the registration of any foundations.
Funding remains one of the key vulnerabilities of Belarusian CSOs. Organizations operating within the country face significant restrictions on their ability to seek, receive, and utilize both domestic and foreign resources. Additional risks include prosecuting individuals for donations to CSOs (including solidarity funds), banking restrictions, and the use of AML/CTF (anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing) procedures to interfere with CSO activities.
Pressure on Belarusian CSOs operating outside the country also continues. Organizations and initiatives in exile face challenges related to legal and institutional adaptation in new jurisdictions, banking barriers, taxation difficulties, reporting obligations, financial operations, data protection, and participant security. At the same time, continued activities directed toward Belarus may be used by the Belarusian authorities as grounds for designating organizations as extremist, initiating criminal proceedings, or exerting pressure on relatives of organization members who remain in the country. Practices of transnational repression, therefore, remain a significant concern.
Liquidation of non-profit organizations
During the monitoring period, instances of decisions to forcibly liquidate two public associations, one non-state institution, and one foundation were identified.
In January 2026, it also became known that criminal proceedings had been initiated[1] against the director of the forcibly liquidated Charitable Foundation “Aid to Seriously Ill Children.” The criminal case was opened under Part 4 of Article 210 of the Criminal Code (misappropriation through abuse of official powers on an especially large scale). According to the investigation, the foundation’s director exercised sole control over the foundation’s activities, managed its assets, and used funds collected for the treatment of seriously ill children for personal purposes. The director faces a prison sentence of five to twelve years, as well as a fine and restrictions on professional activities. Notably, the decision to liquidate the foundation was adopted on February 27, 2026, while the corresponding information was entered into the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs (the USR) only in May 2026.
According to Lawtrend monitoring, from early 2021 through the end of May 2026, at least 1,244 NPOs of various legal forms were forcibly liquidated.
During the monitoring period, it became known that at least six NGOs voluntarily dissolved: four public associations, one institution, and one foundation. All organizations that opted for liquidation were actively operating entities rather than organizations that existed only “on paper.” This is evidenced by their submission of mandatory annual reports to registration authorities and their completion of procedures to amend their statutes in response to changes in legislation governing public associations.
The principal reasons for voluntary dissolution continue to be large-scale repression, an unfavorable legal environment, and sustained pressure on civil society, including pressure directed at the leaders, members, and staff of specific organizations.
As of the end of May 2026, according to monitoring conducted by Lawtrend, the members or founders of at least 787 non-profit organizations (including public associations, associations, foundations, institutions, and a political party) have independently decided to liquidate their organizations since 2021.
Administrative and criminal prosecution of the leadership and members of civil society organizations, as well as other forms of pressure on civil society organizations
In May 2026, the practice of administrative and criminal prosecution of representatives of CSOs, trade union activists, human rights defenders, journalists, representatives of religious organizations, and other participants in civic activities continued. Dozens of representatives of civil society and religious organizations remain detained in places of deprivation of liberty. At least 20 representatives of independent trade unions and the labor movement remain in custody.
The practice of criminal prosecution of individuals accused of cooperating with initiatives and organizations designated by the Belarusian authorities as “extremist” also continues, significantly increasing risks for civil society actors and beneficiaries of assistance. One notable case involved Aliaksandr Karneyeu, who had previously been convicted in absentia under Article 364 of the Criminal Code (“threatening violence against a law enforcement officer”). Following his return to Belarus, he was convicted under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code (“facilitating extremist activities”) for allegedly assisting the “Dapamoga” initiative in organizing the departure from Belarus of individuals subjected to politically motivated persecution. He was sentenced to five years and six months of imprisonment in a high-security correctional facility and fined BYN 42,000. On April 10, 2026, he was added to the List of Citizens of the Republic of Belarus, Foreign Citizens, or Stateless Persons Involved in Extremist Activities.
The application of anti-extremism legislation continues to expand, effectively leading to the criminalization of a broad range of civic activities. As of the end of May 2026, the List of Organizations, Formations, and Individual Entrepreneurs Involved in Extremist Activities included 371 entities, an increase of 6 entities from the previous monitoring period.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus during the previous monitoring period to designate the European Humanities University as an “extremist organization,” representatives of the Prosecutor’s Office publicly stated[2] that studying at, teaching at, maintaining employment relationships with, or providing financial support to the university could potentially result in criminal prosecution. According to the university[3], approximately 100 students left the institution following its designation as an “extremist organization.”
The practice of designating CSO information resources as extremist materials continues. In May 2026, the Republican List of Extremist Materials was expanded to include the websites and social media pages of various organizations and initiatives, including the Threads page “FreeViasna,” the website and social media accounts of Kryly Khalopa Theatre (Тэатр «Крылы Халопа»), the «Зеленый телефон» (“Green Phone”) project, the VKontakte pages of «Еда вместо Бомб» (the “Food Not Bombs”) project, and «Зеленый портал» (“Green Portal”).
Administrative prosecution for participation in cultural and ethnographic events also remains a concern. In the city of Homiel, authorities continued to prosecute participants in the traditional «Гуканне вясны» (“Hukanne Viasny”, in English: “Calling of Spring”) ritual on charges of participating in an “unauthorized mass event.” In total, at least nine individuals were subjected to administrative detention or fines for their participation in the event.
During the monitoring period, reports also emerged regarding the detention of members of the Antifa movement near Baranavichy (Brest Region). State media alleged[4] that the young anarchists had organized a “training camp” and discussed “criminal plans.”
Cross-Border (Transnational) Repression
In May 2026, practices of transnational repression targeting representatives of Belarusian civil society living outside the country, as well as their relatives remaining in Belarus, continued to expand.
Beginning on May 21, human rights defenders received reports of a wave of searches conducted at the homes of relatives of activists who had been forced to leave Belarus. According to available information, at least 30 searches were carried out at the homes of relatives of Belarusians residing abroad. Human rights organizations reported that some of these repressive actions were linked to Belarusians’ participation in Dzień Voli (Freedom Day) events held in Warsaw, Vilnius, Bialystok, and various cities in the United States. Reports also indicated that a new criminal case had been initiated against former political prisoner Pavel Seviarynets, who had previously been forcibly removed from Belarus.
During the monitoring period, it also became known that a search had been conducted at the apartment of Uladzimir Labkovich, a human rights defender with the Human Rights Center Viasna. According to Labkovich, the search was carried out as part of a new criminal case opened following his release in connection with his activities.
Pressure on the relatives of civil society representatives living in forced exile also continued. Officers of the KGB conducted searches at the homes of relatives of Viciebsk activist Dzmitry Karneyenka, against whom several criminal cases have been initiated in Belarus. The authorities have identified the activist as a participant in “extremist formations,” including the Christian Vision project and the Viciebsk-based initiative People’s Deputy. According to the activist, security services regularly visit his relatives.
Searches were also reported at the homes of relatives of individuals standing for election to the Coordination Council. Previously, the KGB had designated electoral lists participating in the Coordination Council elections as “extremist formations.”
Other forms of transnational repression remained prevalent in May 2026. Among the principal instruments of pressure are politically motivated international wanted notices and special and in absentia criminal proceedings. As of the end of May 2026, the Register of Persons Subject to Special Proceedings and Summonsed by Criminal Prosecution Authorities contained 175 individuals.
Analysis of this register demonstrates the systematic use of Article 361-1 of the Criminal Code (“creation, leadership of, or participation in an extremist formation”). This provision is cited in a significant proportion of cases and remains one of the most frequently applied articles within special proceedings. This trend indicates the further institutionalization of anti-extremism legislation as a mechanism for suppressing civic activity.
Particular significance continues to attach to Presidential Decree No. 278 of September 4, 2023, “On the Procedure for Issuing Documents and Performing Certain Actions.” As a result of this decree, Belarusian diplomatic missions abroad ceased issuing, renewing, or exchanging passports for Belarusian citizens residing abroad. Restrictions on consular services have a substantial impact on the ability of Belarusians in forced exile to regularize their legal status, obtain employment, access banking services, pursue education, and receive healthcare.
[1] The text is available in Russian
[2] The text is available in Russian
[3] The text is available in Belarusian
[4] The text is available in Russian