In July 2026, the situation regarding freedom of association in Belarus remained characterized by sustained systemic pressure on civil society organizations (CSOs) and their representatives.
The key trends of the month included the continued shrinking of the institutional space for civil society through the forced and voluntary liquidation of non-profit organizations (NGOs), the use of anti-extremism legislation to prosecute representatives of CSOs, the further expansion of the practice of designating information resources as «extremist materials,» and the application of special proceedings against activists residing abroad.
Another notable trend was the tightening of administrative and financial oversight of legal entities. Authorities further expanded the practice of suspending the bank account operations of organizations deemed absent from their registered legal address and holding their directors administratively liable. These measures also affected NGOs, particularly non-governmental institutions. Legislative amendments adopted in July further broadened the powers of state authorities to suspend the activities of legal entities, freeze transactions through bank accounts and electronic wallets, and impose restrictions on registration-related procedures.
At the same time, the practice of applying legislation on public assemblies to non-political forms of collective activity continued to expand. Participants in cultural, recreational, and other informal events were subjected to administrative prosecution, while the authorities also continued to restrict initiatives aimed at preserving Belarusian culture and national identity.
As of the end of July 2026, the cumulative institutional losses in the civil society sector since the onset of the post-election crisis in 2020 have reached at least 2,053 NGOs. Of these, at least 1,249 NGOs have been forcibly liquidated or are undergoing forced liquidation proceedings, while at least 804 NGOs have decided to self-liquidate.
Liquidation of non-profit organizations
In July 2026, NGO liquidations continued, both at the initiative of state authorities and through organizations’ decisions to undergo voluntary liquidation.
Cases were identified in which the Minsk City Court ordered the compulsory liquidation of three public associations:
- «МашЫна времени» (the MashYna Vremeni, eng. Time Machine) Public Association,
- the «Явар» (Yavar) Ethno-Historical Center, a Public Association, and
- the Liquidators of the 1986 Charnobyl Nuclear Power Plant Disaster Public Association.
Decisions were also adopted to liquidate two private institutions: the Club of Civil Philosophers, an Information and Research Institution (Viciebsk Region, registered in 2021), and the Center for Mediation and Negotiation, an Educational and Practical Institution (Minsk).
In addition, at least four NGOs were reported to have decided to undergo voluntary liquidation: three public associations and one foundation. Such voluntary liquidation remains coercive, driven by the scale of repression, the adverse legal environment, the risks faced by organizational leaders, staff, and members, and the practical impossibility of continuing to operate in accordance with their statutory objectives.
The liquidation of NGOs, therefore, continues to serve as one of the principal instruments for removing independent CSOs from the legal sphere.
Administrative and criminal prosecution of the leadership and members of civil society organizations, as well as other forms of pressure on civil society organizations
In July 2026, the practice of exerting criminal and administrative pressure on CSO representatives (including religious organisations) continued. Dozens of civil society representatives remain detained in places of detention. At least 18 representatives of independent trade unions and the labor movement remain in custody.
Given the limited access to information and the state’s deliberate concealment of politically motivated persecution, it is impossible to determine the full scale of the repression. Nevertheless, new criminal cases and the detention of civil society representatives continue to come to light regularly.
Recently, it became known that at the end of April 2026, Slonim-based civic activists Ales Masiuk, Pavel Sevastyan, and Viktar Marchyk, who had participated in various civic initiatives, were detained.
According to available information, a new criminal case has been initiated against former political prisoner and Hrodna-based activist Pavel Mazheika, who previously headed the institution named Center for Urban Life.
A verdict was handed down against political prisoners Hleb Herasimovich and Aliaksandr Milkamanovich. Each was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment in a medium-security penal colony and fined 500 basic units. They were found guilty under Part 2 of Article 361-1 of the Criminal Code (participation in an «extremist formation»). The criminal prosecution is linked to the State Security Committee (KGB) decision of July 30, 2025, to designate the Green Network coalition of initiatives as an «extremist formation.» Hleb Herasimovich and Aliaksandr Milkamanovich were subsequently included in the list of persons allegedly affiliated with this «formation.» According to available information, however, neither of them was a member or participant of the Green Network. This case illustrates the lack of transparent, verifiable criteria for including individuals on the list of persons affiliated with «extremist formations» and the risk of its arbitrary application.
Application of Anti-Extremism Legislation
The authorities continued to apply anti-extremism legislation, which remained one of the principal instruments used to persecute CSOs and their representatives. As of the end of July 2026, the List of Organizations, Formations, and Individual Entrepreneurs Involved in Extremist Activities included 376 entities.
The practice of designating CSOs’ information resources as «extremist materials» also continued. According to the Prosecutor General’s Office[1], since the beginning of 2026, the Mahileu Regional Prosecutor’s Office alone has filed 234 applications with the courts seeking to have information materials declared «extremist materials.» The Brest Regional Prosecutor’s Office reported that it had identified 117 pieces of «extremist» material online since the beginning of the year.
In July 2026, the Republican List of Extremist Materials was expanded to include, among others, the @eurobelarus TikTok profile, the «Координационный совет» (eng. Coordination Council) page on VKontakte, the «Гражданская инициатива «Гародня» (eng. Hrodna Civic Initiative) Facebook account, the websites of the EU4Belarus–SALT, EU4Belarus–SALT II, EU4Belarus–SALT III, and Education for Belarusians programmes, the website of the Fundacja OKNO NA WSCHÓD foundation, and the Instagram account of the «Побач» (Pobach, eng. Nearby) association of women political prisoners.
In addition, the Mahileu Regional Prosecutor’s Office reported that access had been restricted to nine online resources which, according to the authorities, contained information capable of harming national interests, as well as content allegedly intended to «promote extremist activity» and «discredit state authorities and the law enforcement system.»
Use of Special (In Absentia) Proceedings
In July, the use of special (in absentia) proceedings against representatives of civil society residing outside Belarus continued. On July 27, 2026, the Hrodna Regional Court sentenced Pavel Mitskevich in absentia to five years’ imprisonment in a medium-security penal colony and imposed a fine of 500 basic units. He was convicted under Parts 1 and 2 of Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code for facilitating extremist activity and under Part 1 of Article 369 of the Criminal Code for discrediting the Republic of Belarus.
Pavel Mitskevich is the founder, chair of the management board, and project director of the OKNO NA WSCHÓD foundation, which provides assistance to people displaced from Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia and supports their integration in Białystok.
The continued use of special (in absentia) proceedings demonstrates the transnational nature of the repression directed against representatives of Belarusian civil society.
Restrictions on Public and Cultural Activities
The practice of banning and cancelling events related to Belarusian culture and traditions continued, as did the termination of cultural and entrepreneurial initiatives aimed at preserving Belarusian identity. In particular, an announcement prohibiting the celebration of Kupala Night was posted in the village of Liatokhi near Viciebsk, and the historical reenactment festival Our Grunwald was cancelled. It also became known that the Minsk-based ethnographic shop Ragna had been closed and that the modern Belarusian clothing store Honar had ceased operations.
On July 6, it became known that a group of Belarusians had been detained during a picnic in one of Minsk’s parks. According to published information, law enforcement officers stated that holding such an event required prior authorization, after which the participants were taken to the Department of Internal Affairs of the Pershamayski District of Viciebsk.
A mass detention of participants of the annual gathering of the Rainbow Family movement, held near Rasony (Viciebsk Region), also took place. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs[2], “upon arrival at the site, police officers discovered more than 300 citizens, including foreigners and minors. The participants had set up tents, lit bonfires, and held gatherings with loud music and the use of symbols associated with various religious movements.” Administrative proceedings were initiated against the participants under Article 24.23 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Belarus. Such offences may result in a fine of up to 150 basic units, community service, or administrative arrest.
These events continued the practice of applying Article 24.23 of the Code of Administrative Offences to non-political forms of collective activity. For example, in late June, law enforcement authorities detained several people, including minors, during a private music rave held near Staubtsy (Minsk Region), after which administrative reports were also drawn up against the participants.
These cases demonstrate the increasingly broad application of legislation on public events to non-political forms of collective activity. Cultural, recreational, and other informal gatherings unrelated to political activities are increasingly becoming subject to administrative prosecution.
Control over the Presence of Legal Entities at Their Registered Addresses
The Ministry of Taxes and Duties reported[3] suspending the account operations of more than 2,000 legal entities that, according to the ministry’s assessment, used fictitious registered addresses. Since the beginning of 2026, more than 1,200 addresses have been inspected, at which more than 23,000 business entities are registered.
Since January 1, 2026, tax authorities have been authorized to suspend taxpayers’ account operations if a legal entity is absent from its registered address. According to the Ministry of Taxes and Duties, 50 individuals who failed to notify the registration authority of a change in the organization’s location were held administratively liable under Article 24.11 of the Code of Administrative Offences. More than 1,100 entities remedied the identified violations, and preventive measures were implemented for 5,000 taxpayers.
This practice has also extended to NGOs, primarily non-governmental institutions. It increases the risks for NGOs that are unable to ensure the availability and maintenance of a legal address or to maintain a permanent physical presence at their registered location, potentially resulting in account blocking and administrative liability for officials.
Liability for the Activities of Unregistered Organizations
The Prosecutor General’s Office submitted[4] to the court a criminal case against a man accused of leading an unregistered religious organization and an “extremist formation.” According to the investigation, he headed the religious organization Russian Orthodox Church of the Tsarist Empire and the similarly named “extremist formation.”
His actions were classified under Part 3 of Article 130 and Part 2 of Article 193 of the Criminal Code, which establishes liability for organizing the activities of an unregistered association or religious organization, and Part 1 of Article 361-1 of the Criminal Code.
This case confirms the continued application of criminal liability for the activities of unregistered organizations and the possibility of its simultaneous application alongside anti-extremism-related criminal charges.
Legislation
The status[5] of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs has been changed. Previously, the Commissioner performed the functions of a state administration body and was subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. Under the adopted amendments[6], the Commissioner is now appointed by the President of the Republic of Belarus, reports directly to him, and the overall management of the Commissioner’s office has been assigned to the Presidential Administration. This centralization of governance increases the dependence of state regulation of religious organizations and public associations representing national minorities on the Presidential Administration. It may further strengthen state control in this area.
On July 17, 2026, the Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Amendments to Laws Concerning the Activities of State Control Committee Bodies”[7] was signed, expanding the powers of the State Control Committee (SCC), including the authority to suspend the activities of legal entities, operations on bank accounts and electronic wallets, and to impose bans on registration-related actions.
The expansion of the SCC’s powers indicates a further strengthening of administrative enforcement mechanisms against legal entities, including NGOs. Combined with other legislative changes introduced in recent years, these measures create additional opportunities to restrict CSOs’ activities.
[1] Available in Russian
[2] Available in Russian
[3] Available in Russian
[4] Available in Russian
[5] Available in Russian
[6] Available in Russian
[7] Available in Russian